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COMMENT
DISC: A CONTINUING DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs) have been a
topic of controversy since their inception in 1971.' They were con-
ceived by the Nixon administration primarily as a tax incentive for
United -States firms in order to encourage exports to benefit the
balance of trade deficit.2 Since 1971 several changes have occurred,
placing the proponents of DISC in a constant defensive posture. For
example, the switch from the gold standard to the floating exchange
rate in 1973 raised questions regarding the efficiency of the DISC as an
effective mechanism to stabilize the balance of trade. Such concerns
moved the Congress in 1976 to alter substantially the DISC provisions3
and to lessen the deferred allowances to DISC corporations. Most
recently, efforts were made on behalf of the Carter administration to
repeal the DISC provisions. The potential ramifications of repealing
DISC legislation are comprehensible only after one examines the evolu-
tion of the DISC machinery and its effectiveness as an economic force
in the international and domestic markets. This paper will
demonstrate that despite persuasive arguments to the contrary, DISC
may still be a positive force in the American economy and should not
be repealed at the present time.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DISC
The DISC provisions were enacted in 1971 as an incentive to
American firms to remain in the United States, to employ American
citizens and to increase their exports to improve the United States
balance of payments. The legislation was adopted when the dollar was
still based on a gold standard, two years prior to the conversion to a
floating exchange rate. It was Congress' intention to remove a disad-
vantage to all exporting domestic firms which were ineligible for cer-
tain tax benefits available to foreign subsidiary corporations. These
subsidiaries had the advantage of indefinitely deferring taxation of
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178 (codified in I.R.C. §§ 991-997).
H.R. Rep. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
- I.R.C. §§ 991-997.
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their income as long as it was kept abroad.4 In contrast, domestic cor-
porate income from exports was fully taxable whether the funds were
kept abroad or repatriated.' Additionally, other major trading nations
provided monetary incentives to encourage their export industries; the
enactment of DISC was an effort to place American domestic export-
ing firms in a more competitive position in the international market.
6
Under the DISC deferral system, profits are not to be taxed to the
corporation, but are instead taxable to its shareholders (often a parent
manufacturing corporation) when they are actually distributed or
simply "deemed" distributed.7 In 1971, Congress saw fit to limit the
deferral to fifty percent of the export income of a DISC. As a result, a
domestic sales corporation with income predominantly derived (ninety-
five percent) from export sales and rentals could defer paying tax on
fifty percent of its income if the corporation met the qualifications
provided in the Internal Revenue Code.8
The typical DISC is a subsidiary of a parent manufacturing cor-
poration. To qualify as a DISC a corporation must have at least
ninety-five percent of its gross receipts attributable to export receipts.
At least ninety-five percent of its assets must be export assets. It may
not have more than one class of stock outstanding. It must have a
minimum capital (either par or stated value) of at least $2,500 on each
day of its taxable year and it must elect to be treated as a DISC. 9
A DISC is strictly a sales corporation, which generally acquires ex-
port property from its parent or an affiliated corporation and then
sells those goods abroad. Often, a DISC is a "paper corporation," that
is, merely a commission agent. Thus, the determination of the taxable
income of a DISC is significant because the parent may benefit from
the tax deferral. A parent of a DISC can effectively augment its defer-
There is no explicit statutory rule providing for deferral of tax on foreign
source income. It arises out of the basic jurisdictional distribution between domestic
and foreign corporations. Deferral of non-repatriated foreign source income can accrue
to a domestic taxpayer through ownership of a foreign subsidiary. See I.R.C. §§
861-864.
All income to a domestic corporation will be taxed at the corporate level pur-
suant to I.R.C. § 61 and will again be taxed at the shareholder level upon distribution
pursuant to I.R.C. § 301. "
6 H.R. Rep. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
1 It is important to note that such distributions are treated as dividends and are,
accordingly, taxed as ordinary income. See I.R.C. §§ 995(b), 316(a), and 301(c). Fur-
ther, distributions are generally not eligible for the § 243 dividend deduction. Conse-
quently, the revenue cost effect is not as great as might be anticipated.
8 I.R.C. § 995.
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ral if the combined taxable income of the parent and the DISC from a
particular sale or lease of export property is allocated in a manner
which will maximize the DISC's income share while minimizing that of
the parent. In order to achieve the goal of encouraging exports
through DISCs, Congress enacted special intercorporate allocation
standards for DISCs which were not as restrictive as the arms-length
standard required by the section of the Code concerning the allocation
of income and deductions among controlled taxpayers.10 Two alter-
native methods are available to DISCs," limited only in that these
methods may not be applied in such a way as to cause a loss to be
recognized to the affiliated corporation in conjunction with a net profit
on behalf of the DISC.
Congress has provided that a DISC election is not conclusive as to
tax treatment of the concerned corporation indefinitely. 2 DISC status
may be lost upon failure to meet the above qualifying standards.
Moreover, Congress carefully created a deferral system by providing for
recapture of the income deferred when such income ceased to be
reinvested in export activities.' 3
Consequently, deferral under the 1971 DISC provisions was limited
to fifty percent of the DISC income. 14 The revenue loss to the United
States Treasury was $100 million.'" In 1974, the Treasury released its
first report on DISCs in reference to the year 1972, and determined
that the actual cost of DISC was $250 million annually.' 6 This initial
report increased opposition to the DISC program. However, the
report's true impact is difficult to assess because of vast changes which
occurred in 1972 affecting foreign trade.' 7 Some analysts interpret the
I.R.C. § 992.
'0 Section 482 enables the Treasury to look through inter-corporate transactions
to see that they are bona fide and that the prices and terms are such as would have
been reached between corporations which are not affiliated. The section allows the
government to reallocate funds to achieve an arms-length result.
" I.R.C. § 994(a)(1) and (2).
. I.R.C. § 992(b).
i1 TREAS. REG. § 1.992 (1977).
, I.R.C. § 995.
15 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF DOMESTIC IN-
TERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION LEGISLATION, 1974 ANNUAL REPORT (1976).
16 Revenue Act of 1971 § 506.
" Opponents of DISC assert the the increase in American exports in the in-
tervening period has been the result of the changed monetary environment brought
about by the shift in 1971 to a floating exchange rate and by related changes in the
international environment. See J. Gravell, K. Hughes and W. Farb, The Domestic In-
ternational Sales Corporation (DISC) and its Effect on U.S. Foreign Trade and
DISC
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report as indicating that DISCs had an apparent positive effect on ex-
ports, although the full extent of the effect is not readily ascertain-
able. Is
A second Treasury Report was issued prior to the Tax Reform Act
of 1976. l9 Again, the report indicated that the revenue effects of
DISCs were greater than originally anticipated. This assessment,
however, was still more favorable as to the effect of DISCs on exports.
For 1973, export sales of DISCs showed a 32.6 percent growth rate as
compared to an overall growth rate of 23.4 percent.20 Although the
study noted that the accuracy of such comparisons might be impaired
by methodological problems, it is clear that if even a portion of the
difference in the export growth rate is attributable to DISCs, the
revenues from increased exports could equal or exceed the revenue lost
through the deferred taxation of DISC income.
The continued inability to accurately assess the economic benefits
of DISCs in the face of a readily ascertainable cost, spurred the move-
ment to alter DISCs in 1976. The Library of Congress Research Service
issued an analysis of DISCs and their effect on American foreign trade
and domestic unemployment. 2' The work was based on a continuum,
a view of a best case assumption and a worst case assumption. The
analysis indicated that DISCs may have had some positive impact on
-export growth.2 2 It also stated that DISCs may have had a negative ef-
fect on domestic employment.23 In 1976 analysts attempted to evaluate
the effectiveness of DISCs in the context of a floating exchange rate
economy. The Congressional Research Service study stated that "today
when the dollar exchange rate is floating against the currencies of our
major markets and competitors, the DISC does not appear
necessary." 24
Opponents of DISCs contend that in an environment of floating
exchange rates tie effect of DISC's excessive investment in American
export industries is to put upward pressure on the dollar thereby en-
Unemployment (May 4, 1976) (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
Multilith 76-92E).
" Toan, Repeal of DISC: Prospects and Consequences, 4 INT'L J. TAX. 342
(1975).
19 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION LEGISLATION, 1973 ANNUAL REPORT (1975).
20 Id.
2 J. Gravell, K. Hughes and W. Farb, supra note 17.
22 Id. at 27.
29 Id. at 25.
24 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19.
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couraging American imports. In this manner the stimulative effect on
the export portion of the balance of trade is offset by the accelerated
growth of United States imports.
Responding to these challenges Congress sought to limit the defer-
ral benefits of the DISC form. It concluded that DISC legislation had
had a beneficial impact on American exports;2 5 exports had increased
from $43 billion in 1971 to $107 billion in 1975. Congress recognized
that in addition to the increase attributable to the devaluation of the
dollar, a significant portion of the increase should be credited to the
DISC program. On the other hand, Congress was faced with the fact
that DISCs were increasingly costly in terms of lost revenue. Thus,
Congress imposed an incremental rule which further limited the
amount of income which could be deferred. 26 Under this rule, DISC
benefits are granted only to the extent that a firm increases its exports
over a base period amount.
The new mechanism works as follows: For the taxable years begin-
ning after 1975, the fifty percent deferral of the earlier law applies only
to that fraction of a DISC's taxable income which exceeds the taxable
income attributable to adjusted export gross receipts during a base
period. In effect, the taxable income of a DISC is divided into two
parts. One part, the non-incremental part, equals the taxable income
attributable to export gross receipts of the base period; one-half of the
period; this part is deemed distributed by the DISC and is currently
taxable to its shareholders. The second part, the incremental part, is
the excess of the current year's taxable income over the taxable income
attributable to export gross receipts of the base period; one half of the
incremental portion is deemed distributed and taxed currently to the
shareholders while the other half is deferred.27
Although Congress made an admirable attempt to focus DISC
benefits on genuine enhancement of American exports, the incremen-
tal approach may act as a disincentive to DISC exporters.2 8 Setting the
11 Senate Finance Committee Report, S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
26 I.R.C. § 995(e).
" For a fuller explanation see Gourevitch, DISC's Ability to Defer Tax on In-
come Restricted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 46 J. OF TAX. 9, (1977).
28 A calendar year DISC newly formed in 1976 will have no base period export
gross receipts until 1980 at which time its average base period exports will be its export
gross receipts for 1976 divided by four. For 1981, its average base period gross receipts
will be the combined export gross receipts for 1976 and 1977 divided by four. This
new DISC will receive full DISC benefits, during each of the three successive years. It
will not have a base period consisting of four years until 1983. See Gourevitch, supra
note 27.
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base value equal to a fraction of exports during an earlier base period
may work inequities in some cases, removing the motivation of some
firms to continually escalate their exports. Those whose export markets
are growing quickly or whose prices are rising rapidly will be less af-
fected than others. These initial inequities may be somewhat compen-
stated for by the forward movement of the base period in 1981. The
1975 Treasury Report indicates that the 1976 Act decreased the
amount of DISC income eligible for deferral and also may have
decreased the incentive to expand exports. 29 The problem with the
modified provisions is that the current year exports enter the base for
future calculations; thus, an increment in current exports causes an in-
crease in future base period exports. This process can result in a
greater present deferral, but a lesser deferral in the future. One com-
mentator indicates that this potential incentive to abuse DISC deferral
in order to maximize the usefulness of DISC deferral in individual in-
stances may be a source of great concern to critics of DISC.30
However, modified DISCs have such a short history that it is not possi-
ble to see whether DISC users actually have, or will, slow the expan-
sion of their exports. Therefore, it is still speculative to state that such
abuse has occurred.
Despite these restrictions on DISC tax deferral, controversy still sur-
rounds DISC legislation. The Carter administration recommended the
repeal of DISC as part of the 1978 tax program. The administra-
tion called for a gradual phase-out of DISC deferral, completely end-
ing DISCs in the early 1980's. 3'
III. SHOULD DISCs BE REPEALED?
The opponents of the DISC program view the cost of deferral as
unjustifiable. They argue that DISCs fail to fulfill the expectations of
Congress and are simply a drain on Treasury resources. Rather than
having a positive influence on the balance of trade, it is stated that
DISC may have had a negligible, if not negative, effect on the balance
of trade because of the exchange rate adjustments. "The balance of
payments arguments originally advanced in support of the DISC
legislation are substantially weakened under a system of flexible ex-
19 U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION LEGISLATION, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT (1977).
s Gourevitch, supra note 27.
" U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM 275
(Government Printing Office, 1978).
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change rates." 32 To the extent that DISC may have stimulated
American exports, it may have lessened the depreciation of the dollar.
More rapid depreciation would have encouraged the export industry
independent of DISCs as American goods would become more
desirable in foreign markets. In turn, the growth of domestic imports
would have decelerated. The offsetting effect of the appreciation of
the dollar against export stimulation by DISCs, reduces import prices.
A reduction in import prices leads to increased demand for domestically
produced competitive items. Based on these factors, opponents of
DISCs have determined that any possible positive effects DISCs may
have on the balance of trade are negated by their negative impact on
the domestic import industry.13
A further ramification within the import industry is the negative
impact which DISCs may have on domestic employment. Supporters of
the DISC program have emphasized that by encouraging domestically
produced exports through the parent-subsidiary DISC arrangement,
the domestic job market has been stimulated. 34 In 1976, the number
of jobs attributable to DISCs were estimated between 600,000 and
900,000. 3 1 A rise in exports will surely increase employment in the ex-
port sector but, as opponents point out, an increase in a single part of
the economy does not necessarily translate into an increase in employ-
ment throughout the entire economy. As a corollary to the negative ef-
fects within the import market, it is said that the increased employ-
ment in the export industry generated by DISCs is offset by the loss of
jobs in the disadvantaged import industry. Furthermore, if the affected
import industry is a labor intensive one, then the generation of jobs in
a possibly less intensive export industry will, in fact, shrink the number
of jobs available. There is no method for concluding positively that
DISCs have this negative effect on employment. The factors involved
in analyzing the relationships between DISC exports, non-DISC exports
and imports are numerous and complex, while an increase in employ-
ment in the export sector can be measured. This single certainty is ap-
parently sufficient to satisfy supporters of DISCs.36
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., CONG. REC. 1286 (Feb. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
.. 122 CONG. REC. 11194-11200 (daily ed. June 30, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Fan-
nin).
:5 Id.
36 Id.
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It is also contended by those who seek repeal of the DISC legisla-
tion that it is not clear that DISCs really reduce distortions in trade
caused by the import tariffs of other countries. Additionally it is ques-
tionable whether DISCs effectively offset the competitive advantage of
foreign firms caused by rebates of value-added taxes on exports of
foreign countries. Prior to the enactment of DISC legislation, firms
with subsidiaries abroad had the advantage of deferral on their foreign
income as long as those funds were kept abroad. Further, upon
repatriation of those monies, the corporations could offset much of
their tax liability through the foreign tax credit. Deferral and the
credit enabled American companies overseas to compete in foreign
markets. Congress enacted the DISC provisions to enable a domestic
corporation to enter the export market and to defer tax on a portion
of their income. It was hoped that this would simultaneously en-
courage firms to remain and to invest in the United States and to allow
such firms to enter the foreign market without a competitive disadvan-
tage. It is uncertain whether the deferral benefits of DISCs, in addi-
tion to the foreign tax credit, are really necessary to enable American
corporations to compete abroad. Although a credible argument can be
made that smaller firms could not compete in the export industry
without DISC deferral, the vast majority of firms which avail
themselves of DISC benefits are the large multinational corporations.
"[W]hile the DISC program perversely tends to help those industries
that need help least, it also helps least those industries that need help
most. s3 This subsidy may increase the ability of such firms to com-
pete but it is not necessary to enable these firms to compete in the
foreign market.
Supporters of DISCs state that such deferral must be effective vis-a-
vis foreign competitors because those nations were threatened suffi-
ciently to charge that DISC laws are an illegal subsidy under the
General Agremeent on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).38 Proponents of
DISCs add that DISCs, whether legal or not, might prove a useful
bargaining tool with other GATT nations. This leverage afforded the
United States would be lost if Congress unilaterally repealed the
legislation. Accordingly, it is argued that DISCs should not be ter-
minated until GATT renders a final decision on the acceptability of
31 THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, supra note 31 at 279.
38 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 143,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. See S. Rodriguez,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 18 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 706 (1977).
[Vol. 11:623
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DISCs. Until then they are of benefit in negotiations with other coun-
tries who may make concessions in return for the repeal of the
Revenue Act provision.3 9 However, the Carter administration feels that
"the domestic costs of the DISC program are out of all proportion to
the dubious value of DISC as a bargaining chip in international trade
negotiations." 40
At present, the DISC provisions are inordinately complex and some
critics have called for simplification of the statute. It is suggested that
simplification would make the DISC election more available to smaller
firms which cannot afford expensive tax counsel to lead them through
the myriad of restrictions and qualifications. The statutory complexity,
which requires much expertise to understand, favors the large multi-
nationals which can allocate resources accordingly. Nonetheless, it
would be to the advantage of the multinationals that DISC opponents
succeed because multinationals have other tax shelters available while
small firms may not. Defenders of DISCs state that the provisions
should encourage smaller firms to compete in the export market; yet,
if the nature of the statute precludes small corporations from doing so,
more serious questions are raised as to the necessity of DISC deferral.
The Carter administration raised strong objections to the lenient
price allocation formulas available to DISCs. The flexibility of these
special rules allows a parent (particularly a large corporation) to
manipulate funds to defer part of the parent's income. Such inequity is
not tolerated between related corporations in other parts of the Code
controlled by the arms-length standards set by section 482. 4 In the
1976 Tax Reform Act, Congress enacted three anti-avoidance rules to
help taxpayers resist this temptation. However, the ultimate effec-
tiveness of these rules will depend upon the vigilance of the Secretary
of the Treasury. As the incremental approach takes effect, maximizing
the tax benefits of those DISCs having low or zero level exports during
the base period, the anti-avoidance rules will be called into play.
Perhaps a more realistic approach would be to simply require DISCs to
comply with section 482. In that manner, consistency might be achieved,
lessening the burden on the Secretary and simplifying the regulation of
corporations seeking to abuse the DISC affiliation.
39 Id. at 276.
40 Id.
41 See note 10 supra.
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Despite the availability of economic analysis of DISCs, there is
substantial difficulty in accurately assessing the benefits of DISCs.
Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to estimate the monetary cost to the
United States Treasury. According to the President's tax program,
DISCs cost $1,390 million in 1975. This cost was substantially reduced
in 1976 because of the incremental provisions. Although the 1976 in-
cremental approach reduced the cost of DISCs, it has been said that
the true effect of those provisions may be to discourage exporters. 42
The President further estimated the costs in 1977 and 1978 to be $1.0
million and $1.2 million respectively. The cost to the Treasury in
monetary terms fails to account for the offsetting benefits provided by
DISC. More importantly, the dollar amount does not reflect a complete
loss because of the recapture of DISC income at a later time. DISC re-
quires reinvestment of the deferred taxes into the export base. Those
DISCs which fail to continue to reinvest those funds are required to
repay the deferred taxes. Although this recapture is permitted to be
spread out over a period of time there is no doubt that each DISC so
disqualified will be held accountable for all deferred income. Thus,
although the present cost to the Treasury may be high, it will be
recouped in the case of a failure by a DISC to reinvest and bolster the
export market. All income previously deferred will be recaptured
limited only by a loss due to the present value of such revenues.
Even the most ardent critics admit that DISCs are responsible for
at least modest increases in exports. 43 In light of the balance of trade
deficit which affects the American economy at the present time, it is
reasonable to argue that if DISCs may have any effect on the balance,
they should not be repealed. There is no conclusive evidence that
DISCs are not beneficial to the balance of trade nor that the stimulation
of employment in the export industry has reduced employment in the
import sector. Additionally, it is significant that a DISC deferral,
unlike a deferral generated when a foreign subsidiary fails to repatriate
income, encourages investment and production in the United States.
If, as the President had proposed, the deferral on non-repatriated in-
come were eliminated, many firms with labor intensive production
might return home. The influx of corporations would positively affect
the American economy; however, without DISC benefits the incentive
to return to the United States would lessen because such corporations
would be subject to full taxation. In the absence of DISC legislation,
42 See note 28 supra.
41 See 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29.
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corporations might find it more profitable to remain abroad where
economic conditions might favor the cost of production because they
would at least be able to take advantage of the foreign tax credit.
Retention of DISCs, particularly with the repeal of the deferral on
non-repartiated income, would bring resources back to the United
States. Then perhaps, even in monetary terms, the advantages of DISC
would more clearly outweigh the costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to the lack of conclusive evidence that DISCs have no positive
effect on the American economy, it is reasonable to conclude that DISC
legislation should not be repealed. Despite the arguments against DISCs,
it is still unclear that the DISC is not a factor in offsetting the balance of
trade deficit. Apparently Congress thought it wise to give the DISC pro-
gram a chance to prove itself; the 1978 tax program, in its final form, re-
jected the administration's efforts to extinguish DISCs. In its short life of
only seven years, the DISC provision has been subject to massive changes
and great criticism. The continued existence of this export mechanism
may prove to be the necessary stimulant for the United States export in-
dustry and it may be useful in GATT negotiations. The facts are not yet
in, hence, a decision to repeal DISCs should be indefinitely postponed.
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